*MICROCREDIT - PRODUCTIVE POPULAR CREDIT

Guarantees:

- 1. Solidarity groups
- 2. Credit agents
- 3. Endorsement funds
- 4. Cooperatives
- 5. Consigned
- 6. ICTs (cellphones)
- 7. Fintechs
- 8. Positive register*


To Overcome Information Asymmetries


















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*Microcredit Assessment


According to the Povery Lab (J-PAL / MIT) it is possible that microcredit increases household incomes and reduces poverty, but these effects could only be observed in the long run.


Thesis: many success stories have internal validity, but not external. That is, they are not representative of any situation outside the place where the experiment was carried out

Results of 7 Random Trials in different countries

Outcome	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Ethiopia	India	Mexico	Mongolia	Morocco	Philippines
Business ownership	↑	_	-	_	1	_	_
Business revenue	-	-	-	1	_	1	-
Business inventory/assets	↑	no data	1	no data	↑	1	-
Business investment/costs	-	-	↑	1	no data	1	4
Business profit	-	-	-	_	_	1	-
Household income	-	-	-	-	-	-	Ne
Household spending/consumption	-	4	-	4	↑	-	— So
Social well-being	-	-	-	1	-	-	4

Types of Organizations from a micro-credit perspective)





- Clear vision, mission, focus.
- Good alliances or Internal division of labor: credit operations distinct from others.
- Financial ethos (interest rates, recovery)
- High level of information disclosure
- Self-critical organizations: re-evaluating strategies.
- Generally pro-women

Challenges

- Willingness to borrow is determined by the borrower's access to collateral (land with and without title (individual X communal).
- There is no such thing as the best credit model (e.g. individual or group lending or still institutional lending)
- A beneficiary's repayment capacity should not be underestimated.
- Diversification of the portfolio spreading risks so often associated with agricultural activities.
- The commercialization-credit nexus.
- Capacity building and technical assistance: sine qua non condition to improve resources efficient use.

A Challenged Myth

The regulatory framework & macro conditions are paramount to the performance of credit-related organizations"

- · Evidence 1: institutions within the same regulatory vironment with very different performanc
- Evidence 2: institutions in different environments with similar qualitative performance
 - www.fgv.br/cps


The Brazilian Mystery Why microcredit has a slow advance in Brazil? (1998)

Biases: Consumer, high incomes, Expensive (Spreads), Short Run and Public

Urban Microcredit Use 2014

(Up to R\$ 15,000)


Total 4,00% Self-Employed 3,16% Employer 9,94% The Northeastern Mystery Why Microcredit grew More in the poorest area of the country? (2008)



Change in the Access to

Productive Microcredit

Institutionality of Crediamigo



Alignment Proposal: Incubate Cooperatives from the Solidarity Groups (scale-effect). These groups are well structured financially with good balance sheets and flows statements.

Part 4 - The role of the credit advisor
http://www.fgv.br/ibrecps/VIDEOS/credi3/CREDI 3 assessor.wmv

Crediamigo Impacts

The Monthly Employment Survey (PME) and *CrediAmigo* allow the longitudinal monitoring of individuals, firms and families. Economic impacts of *CrediAmigo* Salvador and Recife with matching techniques.

The usual performance differential of 7.7% with p-value of 2.1% of customers of *CrediAmigo* vis-à-vis other units covered by PME with the same attributes

Economic Mobility

Business Expansion - *CrediAmigo* clients had chances for moving from entrepreneurs to employers 12.5 times higher than the population of entrepreneurs, in general.

Classes - In multivariate exercises we do not reject the hipothesis that for northeastern microentrepreneurs who were initially in Class E, D or C, the access to *CrediAmigo* gave higher probabilities of progression in economic classes scale. For those initially in class A/B, the effect is the opposite.

1/3 of microentrepreneurs and 2/3 of clients are female

Gender Equality	A - Dummy	B - Dummy	Interaction		
Mincerian Equations on Balance Sheets		Last Period	Female	between A and B Dif in Dif	
Receiving Sales Gross Profit	Estimates		-0,2890 -0,2275	4,2% 3,9%	
Operational Profit	P- Value of all estimates <.0001	0,3074	-0,2118	4,1%	

Crediamigo: The Brazilian Grameen

Differences with Grameen: Urban & Public

Similarities:

Sustentability: Low defaults & Subsidies Impacts in Business and Families
Solidarity Groups
Women: Greater Access & Higher Impacts

Other Models

Community Banks and Community Groups of 15 to 30 people




Rural Programs (Pronaf B)
Rural Microentrepreneurs Profit




Rural Microcredit

Agroamigo - Default rate of 1/10 of Pronaf B, as a result of credit agents Does not have solidarity groups

Payments Delays Determinants in Agroamigo



Sample shows effects of the strong northeastern drought



Social Money – <u>Maricá</u>-RJ

Productive Microcredit: Alignments and Innovations

Alignments

Between: Microcredit Actors; Microbusiness Support; Financial Services;

Innovations

- · Connect with SDGs
- Recognize Assets: Human Capital (Profficiency) and Microentrepreneur (Certification)
- Credit Agents and Solidarity Groups
- · Social Money?
- Bolsa Família: Explore CadÚnico, Collateralize Benefits?
- New Bolsa Familia App
- Savings Funds as in private pension For Bolsa Familia?
- (Avoid touching in spreads)



Concentrating the multiplier effect of the Program in the city. But what about the

Consumers wellbeing?

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Some Optional References: www.fgv.br/fgvsocial



Vide video-Extra:

http://www.compaso.com.br/midia/empreendedorismo_br.htm

http://www.povertyactionlab.org/publication/where-credit-is-due
http://www.brsil.gov.br/cidadania-e-justica/2015/10/caiva-lanca-aplicativo-do-bolsa-familia
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